time have been rather harder to view in a positive light. 1 The destructiveness of the two great wars of the Twentieth Century in particular, was so great, whether measured in terms of those killed and wounded, the physical impact on the landscape of the continent, the political or economic disruption caused, or the damage done to
Europe's standing in the world, that a need to avert future large-scale conflict has become almost self-evident. The first underlying imperative that encouraged many politicians and political thinkers to start contemplating some form of European unity has thus been the need to avoid war and to preserve peace within Europe, thereby avoiding the cataclysms that had marked the 1914 to 1945 period. and separate states, was likely to destroy patterns of economic interaction which had developed over the centuries and upon which much of the prosperity of the region relied. 4 The underlying realities of how Europe fed itself, how it produced its goods, and where it sold the output of its factories and workshops, thus led some thinkers and statesmen to the realisation that the political separation of the continent into largely shaping the course of events, they were instead disregarded as the states of the European system tumbled into economic nationalism, autocracy, and ultimately war.
A favourable postwar context
It would thus take the particular circumstances of World War II and its immediate aftermath for the conditions to arise in which these long-present ideas of European cooperation and unity could move from the level of dreams to that of tentative and very partial realities. Exactly how this happened is the subject of intense and detailed scholarly debate, too varied and rich wholly to capture here. 6 But it is perhaps possible to identify a number of factors that helped bring this about.
One element is almost certainly the discrediting of the virulent nationalisms that had helped speed the descent into war. Contrary to some of the first, slightly simplistic accounts, this did not mean that the leaders of postwar Europe despaired of the nation state itself. 7 Rather the reverse in fact, as politicians across Britain and the continent pinned many of their hopes for postwar reconstruction, on the use of state power to plot the course of their recovery, to dampen the social tensions that had helped undermine democracy, and to rebuild a role for themselves in the recast international system. But France too was arguably using integration to position itself, trading in its rapidly diminishing credit as one of the 'victors' of World War II in return for a set of European institutional arrangements designed to prevent the German threat, in particular, from disrupting its recovery and undermining its international position.
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During the interwar period France had tried confrontation with a defeated neighbour and found itself cast, by world opinion, into the role of vindictive villain -a reputation which it had further weakened its position once Hitler came to power.
After World War II its initial attempt to adopt an even tougher punitive stance had collided head on with the very different policy of Britain and America, both of whom were intent on rebuilding a strong Germany. Under the Schuman Plan European controls would take the place of the fastdisappearing Occupying Powers' controls on Germany industry and help prevent a free for all in the heavy industrial sector out of which Germany was always likely to emerge triumphant. One Monnet plan was thus intended to save the other.
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Finally it was necessary to devise a successful plan for integration. Numerous different schemes and ideas were put forward in the first postwar decade, many of which failed to get off the drawing board, others of which never lived up to the high expectations that had surrounded their launch. The ones that mattered though were those that managed to bring together a winning combination of purpose, timing, structure, and membership. The Schuman Plan thus focused on an important sector characterised by both a longstanding rivalry between French and German industry, but also a short term crisis brought about by the imminent ending of allied controls on German production. 18 It was launched at a time when the German government was weak enough still to be interested, and the French government strong enough to act, but already highly conscious of its dwindling leverage over its eastern neighbour. The proposed institutions were powerful enough to do the job they were intended for (controlling heavy industry) and exciting enough to look like a real advance towards European unity, but limited in their scope and hence not unduly threatening to the core of national sovereignty. And its membership was large enough to matter, but small enough for agreement to be feasible. Crucially four countries joined France and Germany in establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), rendering their tense enforced cohabitation that much more tolerable, and giving some credibility to the rhetoric about 'uniting Europe', but the British did not take part, thereby cutting out of the picture a strong sceptic about the integration process with an established track record of watering down integration schemes. The Six -France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg -were almost the ideal grouping within which to launch a scheme of this nature.
In similar fashion the planned EEC had a central purpose, the liberalisation of This is all the more so given the multiple other ways in which Europe and the European Community/Union has evolved and developed over the sixty plus years in which it has been in existence. There are many factors likely to have been responsible for the longevity and success of the EC/EU, but this overview will highlight the three most important: value, adaptability and openness.
The first key reason why the EC/EU has gone on being relevant is the enduring value of its core activity, namely the establishment and maintenance of trade liberalisation within Europe. This task has had the huge merit of being attractive to governments and companies alike, almost attainable, but also never complete. treaties, but now arguably at the very core of the Union, is an obvious case in point.
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As a result, the Community/Union has been able to cope with a vast increase in the number of policy areas that it deals with, a massive expansion in the quantity and complexity of law-making and decision-taking that is required to carry out, and prodigious rise in the number of participating member states. Had the basic mechanisms been less flexible, such a degree of change, would most likely have overwhelmed the system entirely. Instead it has been able to adapt, messily certainly, and often slightly more slowly than it ought to have done, but in a fashion that has allowed it not only to survive but more importantly to do almost incalculably more than the small, six nation customs union originally established in 1958.
Third, the structures designed to cope with a relatively simple six member The first would be to underline the lack of automaticity between the objective need for integration and its realisation. Interwar Europe needed to integrate as much if not more than postwar Europe. And yet despite both the political and economic incentives to follow this course, not to mention the presence of multiple plans and schemes designed to encourage just such a development, no such integration occurred. Instead, Europe became more divided rather than less and ultimately descended into the destructive chaos of World War II. This might suggest that in other regions too, it will not be sufficient merely to discern a need to increase regional cooperation; instead, a huge degree of political will is required in order to overcome the very basic reluctance of all nation states to relinquish any portion of their sovereignty or national independence.
Second the European example would suggest that a multiplicity of different incentives to integrate is a strength rather than a weakness. In Europe at least there was no single reason why the integration process began. Instead different actors perceived different incentives at different times. But rather than being a problem, this was actually central to the success of the integration process. As argued above, it was the very breadth of the EEC's appeal, its ability to attract the hopes of very diverse groupings, seeking seemingly divergent outcomes, that helped not only get the project off the ground but has also helped sustain it ever since. Needless to say such underlying differences of opinion have periodically resulted in sharp internal disagreements. This in part explains why the history of European integration is so littered with crisis and dispute. 22 And yet it has in many ways been the sheer variety of hopes vested in the integration project that has helped keep it going and ensured that it still retains a relevance and a utility decades after its original inception.
Third, the competition between multiple institutional visions has also been an advantage rather than a disadvantage. One of the features of postwar Europe was the huge proliferation of competing cooperative schemes. Many rose and fell with great rapidity. Others lingered on, never quite fulfilling the hopes of those who had founded them, but with too much utility, or too much symbolic value, to be allowed to die. 23 And still others persisted in near complete obscurity, performing helpful even vital functional tasks, but in a manner known only to a tiny minority of sectoral experts. 24 This dense institutional landscape was a help rather than a hindrance to the early integration process however. For a start, successive institutions could learn from the institutional features, both positive and negative, of earlier structures. The nascent EEC for instance quite consciously sought to avoid some of the weaknesses that had beset its predecessor, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation Fifth and finally, the recent difficulties of the EC/EU underline the importance of winning and preserving the support of the wider population for regional cooperation. The fragility of the EU's hold on popular consent could be seen as its greatest historical weakness. The gap between the European ideas of those who govern Europe and those who are governed has arisen for reasons that are fairly comprehensible. The structures of the Community/Union are both baffling and distant from the lives of most Europeans. There has also been a recurrent temptation for all national politicians, to claim for themselves credit for all the gains that integration has brought, while blaming the EC/EU for all the negative consequences of closer cooperation. And it is easier, and in the short term attractive, for politicians and to some extent the media to continue to talk to national populations about European politics in a way that emphasises national autonomy and freedom of manoeuvre, rather than fully acknowledging the extent to which all of the EC/EU member states are dependent on cooperation with each other. But whatever the reasons behind it, this failure fully to educate most Europeans about the realities of the integration process has already become an important check on the integration process -witness the periodic negative outcomes of referendums -and seems likely to cause future difficulties ahead. It is therefore an error that any other regional cooperative project would be well advised to learn from and avoid.
Quite how applicable any of these insights are to other regions of the world, and more specifically to Africa, is a judgment I feel little qualified to make. What is worth stressing by way of conclusion is the way in which European integration reflects a series of underlying realities about the continent, but was only able to begin thanks to a particular set of circumstances that arose in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Crucial amongst these was the discrediting of extreme nationalism, the presence of a serious outside threat, the need for several European countries to rehabilitate and reposition themselves after the trauma of wartime defeat and occupation, and the greater governmental awareness of economic interdependence that arose out of increased state involvement in national economies. Once started, the integration process has then been sustained by the continuing relevance and value of its core liberalising task, the flexibility of its policy remit and its institutional structure which have been able to adapt to shifting reality and take on a vast array of policy tasks never dreamt of by its founders, and its openness to membership applications from a huge number of neighbouring states. A process that began with limited cooperation amongst just six countries in the production and distribution of coal and steel, has thus evolved into the hugely complicated and complex structure of today's
